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Abstract: 
This paper reviews the first evidence on the impact of European Monetary Union on European 
capital markets, one year after the launch of the single currency. Our assessment of this evidence 
is very favourable. On almost all counts EMU has either changed the European financial 
landscape already drastically or has the potential to do so in the future. We argue that this is less 
due to the well-known direct effects of EMU, such as the elimination of intra-European currency 
risk, than to a number of indirect consequences through feedback mechanisms that seem to have 
been triggered by EMU. 
Executive Summary: 
European Monetary Union has presumably been the single most important event for international 
financial markets since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates. It 
represents a challenge to the dollar as the world’s dominant currency. It also opens the possibility 
for the creation of the largest domestic financial market in the world. While a single currency is a 
necessary condition for the emergence of pan-European capital markets, it is not a sufficient one, 
however. Several additional conditions have to be met and the evolution of world finance after 
EMU is likely to be characterised by multiple equilibria. This paper reviews the first evidence on 
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almost all counts EMU has either changed the European financial landscape already drastically or 
has the potential to do so in the future. 
 
Although short-term influences have played a role, such as the catching-up effect after the double 
crisis of the Russian sovereign default and LTCM in the fall of 1998, or the one-off positioning 
effect of new securities issues in the euro market, it is difficult not to see the euro as the major 
factor behind the remarkable transformation of European capital markets in 1998 and 1999. A 
corporate euro bond market has emerged whose issuing activity in 1999 has even exceeded that 
of the dollar market. Primary issues in European equity have reached record highs, with whole 
new markets becoming prominent internationally, such as the Neue Markt in Frankfurt or Italy’s 
Nuovo Mercato. Europe-wide indices have been established. Portfolios begin to be allocated 
along pan-European sectoral lines rather than on a country basis (although it is too early to tell 
whether the euro is producing a truly significant shift in the behavior of equity investors). Eurex, 
the German-Swiss exchange founded in 1998, has not only caught up with other large exchanges, 
but by the end of 1999 had overtaken the Chicago Board of Trade by a clear margin to become 
the world’s largest derivative exchange. Banks all over Europe have merged or formed alliances 
on an unprecedented scale, drastically changing the national banking environments and beginning 
to create international firms and networks. Cross-border mergers in all industries have increased 
strongly, giving rise to record volumes in the European M&A industry. 
 
We argue in this paper that part of this development could have been expected as the 
consequence of what we term the direct effects of the euro. The less immediate potential 
consequences of the euro, which we discuss in this paper, could not have been counted on, 
however. 
 
The direct effects of EMU on capital markets comprise standardisation and transparency in 
pricing, the shrinking of the foreign exchange market, the elimination of currency risk, the 
elimination of currency related investment regulations, and the homogenisation of the public 
bond market and bank refinancing procedures. These effects are similar to those put forward in 
the famous report by the European Commission (1990) on “One Market, One Money”. Some of 
them are relatively straightforward to estimate, others are more elusive, as the Ceccini-Report 
makes clear. 
 
These direct effects typically induce additional indirect effects, which are often more difficult to 
assess. We consider here four different groups of indirect effects: the cost of cross-country 
transactions within the EMU area, the depth or liquidity of European financial markets, the 
breadth of these market breadth, and the institutional changes that are stimulated by EMU. At the 
center of the discussion of these four areas is the well-known observation that arithmetically the 
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in 1995, the combined value of equities, bonds and bank assets outstanding in the 11 EMU 
countries was $21, 084 billion, compared to $22, 865 billion in the U.S. The key question is to 
what extent this arithmetic translates into economic reality. 
 
As far as transactions costs are concerned, EMU has had little direct effects up to now, but has 
clearly made the existing obstacles and inefficiencies more visible, for market participants and 
policy makers alike. Within Europe, cross-border payments and securities settlement are more 
expensive, lengthier, riskier, and less standardised than domestic ones. Furthermore, the euro area 
has 18 large-value systems (the U.S. has 2), 23 securities settlement systems (3 in the U.S.), and 
13 retail payments systems (3 in the U.S.). Differences in taxation, legislation, and standards 
create further well-known obstacles. 
 
Yet, EMU has provided new urgency to policy makers to address these problems. The 
establishment of TARGET and EURO1, the settlement systems for large transactions of the 
European System of Central Banks and the European Banking Association, respectively, and the 
implementation (in August 1999) of the EU Directive 97/5/EC of January 1997 on cross-border 
credit transfers are some of the most visible steps taken in that direction. 
 
The problem of remaining transaction costs notwithstanding, by eliminating currency risk EMU 
has put traders in foreign euro-denominated assets on an equal risk base with domestic traders. 
This together with the increase in transparency resulting from the single currency has greatly 
reduced the barriers to trading such assets. In this sense, EMU has increased the demand side of 
the market for each asset traded in the euro zone, and this for bonds, commercial paper, equity, 
and all other types of financial assets alike. To the extent that the expanded markets indeed give 
rise to increased trading, the single currency therefore has reduced liquidity risk. 
 
However, an important theoretical feature of markets with transactions costs and liquidity risk is 
the possibility of multiple equilibria. In such markets depth is endogenous, and “virtuous circles” 
of high trading activity and low liquidity risk are as much possible as “vicious circles” of low 
trading and high liquidity risk. When assessing the impact of the euro on liquidity it is, therefore, 
important to not only add up the different pre-euro domestic markets, but also to evaluate the 
relationship between market prices, trading volume, the number and size of participants, and 
transaction costs in the market after EMU. 
 
In a first, incomplete analysis of public and private bond and equity markets we find that markets 
have indeed deepened considerably, although there is still scope for further integration of the 
public bond market. Private bond and primary equity markets have expanded at a speed and to a 
point where it is possible to speak of an equilibrium switch, with secondary equity markets 









INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR FINANCIAL ASSET MANAGEMENT AND ENGINEERING 
40 bd du Pont d’Arve • P.O. Box 3 • CH-1211 Geneva 4 • tel +41 22 /312 0961  • fax +41 22 /312 1026 




The second main benefit of increased market size resides in better diversification possibilities. 
In theory, the reduction of costs and risks of cross-border transactions allows investors to better 
spread the fundamental risk of their asset holdings and to rebalance portfolios towards assets that 
previously were too costly in terms of the risk–return tradeoff of standard portfolio theory, 
typically towards foreign ones. The problem with this theoretical argument is that it is known to 
be flawed. As documented repeatedly in the 1980s and early 90s, the share of international equity 
in total equity holdings by domestic investors has traditionally been too small to be compatible 
with the standard portfolio model (the so-called home-bias puzzle). 
 
We argue instead that the historical equity home bias may be better explained by informational 
problems faced by domestic investors when valuing foreign securities. In this view, the lack of 
transparency and trading opportunities in continental European firms, as well as the weakly 
developed equity culture of European investors explain the paucity of equity flows into and out 
of Europe until the 90s, while the change in both these features in the course of the 90s explain 
the observed increases of equity flows. EMU then fosters market integration, not by eliminating 
forex risk, but by improving information flows and by reorienting traditional international asset 
allocation methods from a country basis to a pan-European industry basis. If international 
transactions costs are high, only few firms will find it profitable to change their portfolio 
strategies, but if these costs come down, a major shift in intra-European portfolio allocation is 
possible. Whether and to what extent the record turnover on European primary and secondary 
equity markets in 1999 can be attributed to this effect is too early to tell, but it certainly is 
consistent with it. 
 
Turning to financial market institutions and participants, we note some surprising success stories, 
such as the rise of Eurex to become the world’s leading derivative exchange, and increased, 
possibly destructive competition among stock exchanges. The main players in the European 
capital markets, banks, have been affected by EMU in different ways. In particular, while the 
changes in capital market activity tend to hurt the traditional deposit and lending business of 
commercial banks (by producing a “shift from banks to markets”), they benefit the more market 
based asset management and investment banking activities. We argue that banks, especially in 
Europe, continue to be important in an environment of deepening and broadening capital markets. 
However, they have had to adjust significantly in the past few years and the evidence suggests 
that this adjustment has been mixed and not always satisfactory. Several indicators, such as the 
evolution of M&A activity, suggest that EMU has had a major effect on bank restructuring in 
Europe. 